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Watts: Let's All Go To The Movies

NOTE
LET'S ALL GO TO THE MOVIES,
AND PUT AN END TO DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION:

OREGON PARALYZED VETERANS
OF AMERICA V. REGAL CINEMAS,
INC. REQUIRES COMPARABLE
VIEWING ANGLES FOR
WHEELCHAIR SEATING
INTRODUCTION

Imagine for a moment that it is a Friday night and you
and a friend decide to see the hottest new movie. You arrive at
the state-of-the-art theater, purchase your tickets, some popcorn and a drink. You then head inside the theater to find a
seat. As the two of you walk in, you realize that the place is
packed. Disappointment washes over your face as you reluctantly notice that the only seats left are right in the front row.
So, you sit down, crane your neck back to see the whole screen,
and try to focus on the flashing advertisements soliciting the
anxious theater patrons. The excitement that initially led you
to the movie theater in the first place has all but dissipated as
you realize that you will be in this position for the next couple
of hours. To compensate, you slouch in your seat and try to
make the best of it. What if you couldn't improve your vision
by slouching in your seat? What if every time you went to see a
movie, this was where you would be forced to sit? To disabled
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moviegoers who are in wheelchairs, this is not a meaningless
hypothetical, but harsh reality.l
In the mid-1990s, designs for movie theaters began implementing stadium-style seating. 2 A stadium-style theater differs in many ways from the traditional incline or slopedauditorium design.3 Stadium-style theaters more closely resemble the design and seating configuration of a sports stadium or arena that provides stepped-seating rising at a slope
greater than five percent.4 Like a stadium, each step contains
a row of seats, and the steps ascend "all the way to the back
(top) of the auditorium."5 Unlike the traditional design, in stadium-style theaters the entrance is typically at the front of the
auditorium (bottom of the steps) rather than at the rear (top of
the steps).6 The main purpose behind this newer elevatedseating configuration of stadium-style theaters is to combat the
traditional line-of-sight problems that result from the customary inclined-theater design, i.e., the frustration and dissatisfaction felt by shorter individuals when taller individuals sit in
front of them. 7 The stadium-style design purports to offer a
heightened movie-watching experience with unobstructed
views of the screen. S Since the stadium riser section of the
theater is not wheelchair-accessible, wheelchair-bound patrons
are forced to sit in the front row and thereby placed at a viewing disadvantage. 9

1 See generally Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No.
03·641); Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 2003); Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas
Corp., No. 02-9034, 2003 WL 21510423 (2nd Cir. July 1, 2003).
2 Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1132
(9th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 03641) [hereinafter Regal Cinemas 1I]. See also, Scott Williams, Movie Seating Options
Called Lacking For Wheelchair Users, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Sept. 30, 2003,
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wauk/sep03/173588.asp (last visited Feb. 15,
2004).
3 Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1
(W.D.Tex. Aug. 21, 1998) [hereinafter Lara I).
• Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 785 (5th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Laram.
5 Lara I, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1.

6Id.
7
8

Lara II, 207 F.3d at 785.
Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1127.

9Id.
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The disadvantage wheelchair-bound patrons experience
due to the stadium-style theater design is physical discomfort. lo
Since wheelchair-bound patrons are generally forced to sit in
the front rows of movie theaters, disabled patrons must stretch
their necks back into an uncomfortable position just to view the
screen.ll AB a result of sitting in these positions for an extended period of time, these patrons experience dizziness, nausea, headaches, and blurred vision. 12 Disabled patrons claim
they are the targets of unlawful discrimination as a result of
being forced into these less advantageous seats. 13
In an effort to alleviate discrimination of this sort against
individuals with disabilities, Congress passed the Americans
with Disabilities Act (hereinafter"ADA").14 Title III of the ADA
prohibits disability-based discrimination in public accommodations, such as movie theaters.15 To ensure that all individuals
equally enjoy the movie-watching experience, disabled patrons
must be afforded "lines of sight comparable" to those offered to
non -disabled moviegoers. 16
Several suits have arisen attacking the stadium-style
theater design as discriminatory against wheelchair-bound patrons due to non-compliance with ADA regulations. I? Section

10

[d. at 1128.

See generally Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Hoyts
Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73; Meineker, 2003 WL 21510423. This general assertion
regarding the placement of wheelchair seating at the front of most stadium-style theaters stems from the information set out in the cases discussed in this Note.
12 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1128.
13 See Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Hoyts Cinemas,
256 F. Supp. 2d 73; United States v. AMC Entertainment, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092
(C.D. Cal. 2002); Meineker, 2003 WL 21510423.
" 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000). "No individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." [d. In relevant part, public accommodations are defined as a motion picture
house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment. 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (2000).
16 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
17 See Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Hoyts Cinemas,
256 F. Supp. 2d 73; AMC Entertainment, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092; Meineker, 2003
WL 21510423.
11
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4.33.3 of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (hereinafter
"ADAAG"), states that "[wlheelchair areas shall be an integral
part of any fIxed seating plan and shall be provided so as to
provide people with physical disabilities a choice of admission
prices and lines of sight comparable to those for members of the
general public."18 Specifically, the issue surrounding these
suits is the meaning of lines of sight comparable. Advocates for
the disabled argued that the "lines of sight" language required
taking into account the viewing angles of patrons. 19 A contention, that if validated, would cause many theaters, undoubtedly, to find themselves out of compliance with ADA regulations. 20 After all, the viewing-angles disparity is too great to
ignore. 21 On one hand, able-bodied patrons can view a movie
comfortably from a variety of seats. A majority of these seats
do not require even the slightest arching of the neck to view the
screen. Disabled patrons, on the other hand, are forced to sit in
the front row because most theaters fail to provide alternative
seating. As a result of such inadequate accommodations, disabled patrons are forced to arch their necks back to view the
movie, thereby suffering a series of physical discomforts. 22
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided this
exact issue in favor of disabled moviegoers. 23 In Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., the court held
that viewing angles must be taken into account when assessing
comparability of lines of sight.24 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit, which decided the
issue three years before in favor of theater owners.25 In Lara v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that lines of sight

See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003) (emphasis added).
See generally Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Hoyts
Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73; Meineker, 2003 WL 21510423.
20 Regal Cinema 11,339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
21 See Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1128.
22 See Id.
23 See Id. at 1133.
24 Id.
2!i See Lara II, 207 F.3d 783.
18

1.
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did not encompass viewing angles, and instead required only
that views to the screen be unobstructed. 26
Although times are changing and technology is advancing
in more ways than people can keep track of, it is important to
ensure that these achievements do not come at the expense of
discrimination. This Note contends that the Ninth Circuit was
correct in finding that in order to ensure comparable lines of
sight for disabled and non-disabled patrons, viewing angles
must be taken into account.27 Part I provides a general background of Title III of the ADA, and specifically addresses section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG and its history.28 Additionally, Part I
examines the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lara, as it played a
major role in the outcome of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Regal. 29 Part II analyzes both the majority and the dissenting
opinions offered in Regal. 30 Part III defends the majority opinion in Regal through a critique of the Regal dissent. 31 Part IV
discusses other cases arguing the same issues, taking the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Lara into consideration. 32 Lastly, Part V
concludes that the Ninth Circuit was correct in ruling that a
valid interpretation of section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG includes a
viewing-angle consideration. 33

26 Id. at 789.
Recently, the Sixth Circuit had a chance to deal with the issue as
well. See United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003). In that
case, the Sixth Circuit like the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the Lara
court, and concluded that the "lines of sight comparable" language "clearly requires
more points of similarity than merely an unobstructed view." Id. at 579. Since, the
Sixth Circuit is in accord with the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit's decision will not be
discussed in this Note.
Z1 Regal CiTU!mas II, 339 F.3d at 1133.
2B See infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 73-137 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 138-183 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 184-226 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A.

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

[Vol. 34

Congress passed the ADA recognizing that disabled individuals continuously suffer from discrimination, isolation, segregation, and a lack of physical access to various services and
facilities. 34 In order to preserve the civil rights and liberties of
handicapped and disabled people, the ADA provides "a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."35 Title III
of the ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination in public
accommodations, and generally requires that public accommodations and commercial facilities designed and constructed for
first occupancy after January 26, 1993, be "readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities. "36
In 1991, Congress prompted the Department of Justice
(hereinafter "DOJ") to issue a set of regulations providing substantive standards applicable to facilities covered under Title
III.37 Consistent with a Congressional mandate, the DOJ
adopted a set of guidelines promulgated by the Architectural
and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (hereinafter
"Access Board").38 Aside from advising and providing technical
assistance to individuals or entities with rights and duties under Titles II and III of the ADA, the Access Board is a body
charged with "establish [ing] and maintain [ing] minimum
guidelines and requirements for the standards issued pursuant
to" Title III of the ADA.39 Together the Access Board and DOJ
issued the ADAAG.40 Within the stadium-style movie theater
context, the relevant provision of the ADAAG in dispute is sec42 u.s.c. § 12101(a)(1)-(3),(5) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
'" 42 u.s.c. § 12183(a)(1) (2000). The ADA specifically states that public accom·
modations include movie theaters. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (2000).
37 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2000).
38 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c) (2000).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (2000). "The Access
Board is an independent Federal agency devoted to accessibility for people with disabilities. It operates with about 30 staff and a governing board of representatives from
Federal departments and public members appointed by the President." The Access
Board website, available at http://www.access-board.gov/indexes/aboutindex.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2004).
39 29 U.S.C. § 792(b)(2), (3)(B) (2000).
40 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a) (2003); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A. (2003).
34

35
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tion 4.33.3, which deals with the placement of wheelchair seating in assembly areas.4l Section 4.33.3 states in relevant part,
"[w]heelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with
physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of
sight comparable to those for members of the general public."42
At issue in the cases discussed in this Note is the meaning
of the regulatory language "lines of sight comparable" contained in section 4.33.3. 43 The DOJ interpreted the "lines of
sight" language to require that viewing angles for patrons in
the wheelchair seating of stadium-style theaters be comparable
(similar or equivalent) to the viewing angles offered to the general public. 44 The DOJ publicly announced this interpretation
in several amicus briefs in attempts to settle particular cases. 45
The Access Board acknowledged the DOJ's new interpretation
of section 4.33.3 in its proposed rules. 46 The Access Board

" 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
" Id.
(emphasis
added).
Section
4.33.3
further
states:
They shall adjoin an accessible route that also serves as a means of egress in case of
emergency. At least one companion fixed seat shall be provided next to each wheelchair seating area. When the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall be
provided in more than one location. Readily removable seats may be installed in
wheelchair spaces when the spaces are not required to accommodate wheelchair users.
EXCEPTION: Accessible viewing positions may be clustered for bleachers, balconies,
and other areas having sight lines that require slopes of greater than 5 percent.
Equivalent accessible viewing positions may be located on levels having accessible
egress.Id.
" Id .
.. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging Reversal at 10, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-35554) [hereinafter Appellants Brief Urging Reversall .
.. See Appellants Brief Urging Reversal at 10; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees Urging Affirmance at 14, Lara v. Cinemark
USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-50204) [hereinafter Appellees Brief
Urging Affirmancel. An amicus brief is a brief written by an amicus curiae, which is
Latin for "friend of the court." Amicus curiae is ural person who is not a party to a
lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the
action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 66 (7th ed. Abridged 2000) .
.. See ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 62,248, 62,278 (Access
Board Nov. 16, 1999).
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stated that it would consider requirements in the final rule
that would harmonize the DOJ's interpretation of the regulation as it applied to stadium-style movie theaters.47 The rule,
however, has not been amended to incorporate the DOJ's concerns. 4S
B.

COMPARABLE LINES OF SIGHT REQUIRES ONLY AN
UNOBSTRUCTED VIEW

Although the stadium-style theater design was in use for
only a couple of years, disabled moviegoers in Texas were the
first to realize the new design's failure to offer them equal enjoyment of the movie-watching experience. 49 The first case to
challenge the stadium-style design was Lara v. Cinemark USA,
Inc. 50 In December 1997, a group of disabled persons and advocacy groups brought a civil action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas against the owner of
Tinseltown USA, a movie theater complex. 51 In Lara, the
plaintiffs alleged that the twenty-screen stadium-style movie
theater complex did not comply with ADA standards.52 Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that eighteen Tinseltown theaters
were in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 12182(a) and section
4.33.3 of the ADAAG because the wheelchair seating provided

., Id. [The] DOJ has asserted in attempting to settle particular cases that
wheelchair seating locations must: (1) Be placed within the stadium-style section of the
theater, rather than on a sloped floor or other area within the auditorium where tiers
or risers have not been used to improve viewing angles; (2) provide viewing angles that
are equivalent to or better than the viewing angles ... provided by 50 percent of the
seats in the auditorium, counting all seats of any type sold in that auditorium; and (3)
provide a view of the screen, in terms of lack of obstruction (e.g., a clear view over the
heads of other patrons), that is in the top 50 percent of all seats of any type sold in the
auditorium. The Board is considering whether to include specific requirements in the
final rule that are consistent with DOJ's interpretation of 4.33.3 to stadium-style movie
theaters_ Id .
.. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
• 9 See Lara I, 1998 WI. 1048497, at *1.
50 Lara II, 207 F.3d 783.
51 See Lara I, 1998 WI. 1048497, at *1.
The plaintiffs in this action are seven
individuals consisting of Jose G. Lara, E.J. Lozano, Alfred Juarez, G. Tim Hervey, Earl
L. Harbeck, Luis Enrique Chew, and Myra Murillo, and two advocacy groups for people
with disabilities consisting of the Volar Center for Independent Living and Desert
Adapt. Id. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive and declarative relief. Id.
52Id.
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in the front of the auditorium did not offer comparable lines of
sight to those provided to non-disabled theater patrons. 53
In a case of first impression, the district court in Lara discussed the application of 42 U.S.C. section 12182(a) and section
4.33.3 to a stadium-style theater. 54 Like most stadium-style
theaters, Tinseltown's theaters provide one entrance located at
the front of the theater, directly in front of the movie screen.55
Accordingly, Tinseltown's designated wheelchair row was located on the same level as the entrance, in the front row of the
overall seating. 56 The plaintiffs complained "that viewing the
movie screen from the level of the entrance is very awkward
and uncomfortable, because it is too close to the screen and too
far below its [the screen's] level."57 The precarious placement of
the wheelchair row forced wheelchair-bound patrons to raise
their eyes and crane their necks at extremely uncomfortable
angles just to watch the movie. 58
Plaintiffs interpreted the word "comparable," as used in
section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG, to mean that seating for wheelchair-bound patrons must provide those patrons with lines of
sight similar or equivalent to those available to non-disabled
patrons, assuring that disabled moviegoers are not relegated to
the worst seats in the auditorium. 59 The district court agreed,
holding that Tinseltown theaters did not afford patrons with
comparable lines of sight.60 The court stated that as a result of
their discomfort, wheelchair-bound patrons are "denied the full

53 [d. at *2. The design of the other two theaters are not an issue in this case,
since both have a second entrance at the back of the auditorium that is wheelchair
accessible by means of an elevator, and allows for a wheelchair row located at the rear
of the auditorium. [d. at *1, n.I-2.
M [d. at *2.
55 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
56 Lara [, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1.
57 [d.
58 [d. at *2.
"The average viewing angle from this row is above thirty-five degrees, which the Plaintiffs' expert witness has properly described as 'well into the discomfort zone'." [d .
.. [d. Indeed, comparable is defined as "capable of or suitable for comparison;
equivalent, similar." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 267 (1984).
60 Id.
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and equal enjoyment of the movie going experience in these
eighteen theaters" as compared to the average patron.61 The
court concluded that the defendant's theaters violated the ADA
and the ADAAG, and were subsequently ordered to modify the
eighteen theaters accordingly.62
The victory, however, for these wheelchair-bound movie
buffs was short-lived. In April 2000, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 63 In its opinion, the court of appeals stated that until now,
no court questioned whether section 4.33.3' required comparable viewing angles for wheelchair-bound patrons as compared
to the general public. 64 Although the DOJ filed two amicus
briefs outlining their interpretation of section 4.33.3,65 the court
found that the DOJ and Access Board did not explicitly consider issues surrounding viewing angles prior to enacting section 4.33.3, and that the Access Board only recently considered
revising the section to include such requirements. 66 Further,
the court looked to the meaning of "lines of sight" as inter61Id.
62 Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1999 WL 305108, at *2
(W.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1999). Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was granted. Lara 1,
1998 WL 1048497, at *3. Plaintiffs Jose G. Lara, Alfredo Juarez, Earl L. Harbeck, Luis
Enrique Chew, and Myra Murillo were each awarded $100 under the Texas Human
Resources Code, §121.004(b). Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1999
WL 305108, at *3 (W.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1999). Plaintiffs G. Tim Hervey (not wheelchairbound) and E.J. Lozano (blind) were awarded no damages, since it is not clear they
were affected by the defendant's noncompliance. Id. Plaintiff Margarita LightbourneHarbeck is not mentioned in the result. Id. Further, all plaintiffs were entitled to
attorney's fees and the court directed plaintiffs to file the requisite motions within
fourteen days from the entry of the judgment. Id. Modifications included moving the
wheelchair seating farther away from the screen and higher off the floor, as well as
lowering the height of the screen by approximately one foot. Lara 11,207 F.3d at 785.
Although directing these modifications to be made, it was not explicitly stated how
wheelchair-bound patrons would get to these newly provided spaces located further
from the screen and higher from the ground.
63 Lara 11, 207 F.3d 783.
MId. at 788. However, the court did note that whether lines of sight for wheelchair seating needed to be unobstructed by standing spectators under section 4.33.3
was an issue that several courts had already undertaken. Id.
65 See Appellees Brief Urging Affirmance at 14. In Lara, the DOJ submitted one
amicus brief at the district court level and one at the appellate level. Id. Although not
published, "the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice was
allowed by the Court to file a brief as amicus curiae." Lara 1, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1.
66 Lara 11, 207 F.3d at 788. The court further noted that "while the DOJ's 1994
Technical Assistance Manual explicitly requires theaters to provide 'lines of sight over
spectators who stand,' the manual does not address problems involving viewing angles." Id.
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preted in other contexts and concluded that the phrase meant
"unobstructed view."67
Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge W. Eugene Davis held
that section 4.33.3 does not impose a requirement affording
disabled patrons the same viewing angles available to nondisabled patrons. 68 Instead, Judge Davis stated that the regulations mandated only that the patrons' view of the screen be
unobstructed. 69 According to the court, "[t]o impose a viewing
angle requirement at this juncture would require district
courts to interpret the ADA based upon the subjective and undoubtedly diverse preferences of disabled moviegoers."70 Since
Tinseltown's theaters provided the wheelchair-bound patrons
unobstructed lines of sight, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that defendants were in compliance with ADA regulations. 71 On October 16, 2000, the United States Supreme Court
denied the plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari. 72 By this
time, however, a case in an Oregon district court was already
under way presenting the same issue that the Fifth Circuit decided in Lara.

67 [d. at 788-89.
To interpret the language "lines of sight," the court used the
following federal regulations: "See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.685 (2000) (FCC regulation
requiring that antennae have line of sight, without obstruction, of the communities
that they serve); 46 C.F.R. § 13.103 (2000) (defining direct supervision as having line of
sight of the person being supervised); 36 C.F.R. § 2.18 (2000) (forbidding people under
age 16 from operating snowmobiles unless they are "within line of sight" of a reasonable person over age 21)." [d.
68 Lara II, 207 F.3d at 789.
69 [d.
70 [d.
71 [d.
72 Lara II, 207 F.3d 783, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000).
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COMPARABLE LINES OF SIGHT REQUIRE COMPARABLE
VIEWING ANGLES

In April 2000, the Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America,
along with Kathy Stewmon, Tina Smith, and Kathy Braddy,
brought three claims in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon, against Regal Cinemas, Inc. 73 In Oregon
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas, Inc.,74 plaintiffs asserted that the wheelchair seat locations within six of
Regal's theaters failed to comply with ADA requirements. 75
Once again, the meaning of "lines of sight comparable" was at
the heart of this lawsuit, because similar to Tinseltown's theaters in Lara, Regal's theaters employed stadium-style seating
configurations.76 The plaintiffs in Regal argued that "these
words impose a viewing angle standard such that wheelchair
seating areas must be placed in the stadium seating portion of
theaters and not just in the front rows of a theater that provide
inferior and uncomfortable viewing angles. "77
The plaintiffs adopted the DOJ's position concerning section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG as offered during Lara and outlined
in their amicus briefs. 78 Despite the Fifth Circuit's rejection of
the DOJ's new interpretation, the plaintiffs asked the Oregon

73 Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d. 1293,
1294 (D. Or. 2001) [hereinafter Regal Cinemas 1]. Eastgate Theatre Inc., d/b/a Act III
Theaters, Inc was also named as a defendant in the action, however, since the district
court referred to the defendants collectively as "Regal", this Note will do the same. [d.
74 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126.
75 Regal Cinemas [, 142 F. Supp. 2d. at 1294.
"The plaintiffs also claimed that
the seating plans violate Oregon's public accommodations statute, Or.Rev.Stat. §
659.425(3), and claimed negligence in the design, construction, and operation of the
stadium-riser theaters. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory
and punitive damages under the Oregon statute, and damages for negligence (in an
amount to be proved at trial), in addition to attorneys' fees and costs." Regal Cinemas
II, 339 F.3d at 1127. After the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all three claims, plaintiffs only appealed the ADA claim. [d. Accordingly, this
Note will only discuss the ADA claim.
76 Regal Cinemas [,142 F. Supp. 2d. at 1294-1295.
77 [d. at 1295. Accordingly, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. [d.
at 1294.
78 [d. at 1296. The new interpretation of section 4.33.3 "required the following in
stadium-style theaters: 'wheelchair locations must be provided lines of sight in the
stadium seating seats within the range of viewing angles as those offered to most of the
general public in the stadium style seats, adjusted for seat tilt.'" [d.
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court to adopt the DOJ's litigating position in Lara as its latest
interpretation of section 4.33.3. 79
Although the Oregon district court admitted it was
tempted to follow the reasoning of the Texas district court in
Lara, making its decision based on the plain meaning of the
regulation,so the court ultimately followed the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning. SI Not only was the district court persuaded by the
regulation's history and "the context in which it was promulgated," but also by the fact that stadium-style theater design
did not come into effect until 1995, four years after the DOJ
adopted section 4.33.3. S2 The district court did not defer to the
DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 and further stated that,
"it would be unreasonable and inconsistent with the history of
Section 4.33.3 (including statements by the Access Board) to
interpret it to require stadium-style theaters to provide wheelchair-bound moviegoers with comparable viewing angles. "S3
The district court was not confident that an amicus brief was
an appropriate way to announce an agency's interpretation of a
rule. 84 The court further noted that establishing appropriate

[d. at 1296.
[d. at 1296-97, quoting Lara I, 1998 WL 1048497, at *2. Plain meaning was a
term coined by the district court in Regal, which described the district court's analysis
in Lara, interpreting the language of section 4.33.3 "in their common, ordinary, English language, dictionary meaning." Id. Plain meaning is additionally defined as the
meaning attributed to a document (usually by a court) based on a commonsense reading of the words, giving them their ordinary sense and without reference to extrinsic
indication's of the author's intent. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 796 (7th ed. Abridged
2000).
8' Regal Cinemas 1,142 F. Supp. 2d. at 1297.
82 [d. Of great importance to the Oregon district court was the fact that in 1994,
the DOJ stated in its Technical Assistance Manual the requirement that certain auditoriums must provide unobstructed lines of sight over patrons who stand, but mentioned nothing about viewing angles. Id. Since § 4.33.3 was advanced in 1991 and
stadium-style theaters didn't come about until 1995, the court felt that was dispositive
of the fact that the regulation could not and did not speak to the issue of lines of sight
in stadium-style movie theaters. Id. The fact that the Access Board did not consider
such concepts as viewing angles in stadium-style seating until 1999, provided more
strength for the court's argument in siding with the Fifth Circuit. Id.
83 [d. at 1297-98 .
.. [d. at 1297.
79

so

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 3

14

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

viewing-angle standards is a task better left to "notice and
comment rule making rather than through an interpretive
rule."85 Accordingly, summary judgment was granted in favor
of defendants. 86
A.

THE REGAL MAJORITY

On appeal, Judge Betty Fletcher, writing for the majority
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, disagreed with the district court and reversed its findings. 87 First, the majority disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning (so heavily relied
upon by the district court), which claimed that to analyze comparability in such terms would require delving into the subjective seating preferences of moviegoers. 88 The Ninth Circuit relied on the engineering guidelines of the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers (hereinafter "SMPTE").89 The
SMPTE established exact points at which most viewers
reached a point of physical discomfort. 90 Based on the SMPTE
guidelines, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the physical dis-

.. [d. at 1298 n.2. The full quotation from the district court is as follows: "[Tlhe
vague viewing angle standards cited in the record cry out for a detailed methodology
that would best be developed and imposed through notice and comment rulemaking
rather than through an interpretive rule." [d. The court did not elaborate on this
point, however the court was most likely concerned that this type of change was better
suited for the legislation to handle. [d.
86 [d. at 1298.
Summary judgment was also granted against the plaintiffs on
each of their other two claims. Regal Cinemas 11,339 F.3d at 1127.
87 [d. at 1127. The plaintiffs only appealed the district court's ruling on the ADA
claim. [d. Further, only the individual plaintiffs filed the appeal. [d. at 1127 n.1.
Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America did not join in the appeal. [d.
88 Regal Cinemas 11,339 F.3d at 1132 n.7.
89 [d. at 1128. "SMPl'E was founded in 1916 to advance theory and development
in the motion imaging field. Today, SMPl'E publishes ANSI-approved Standards,
Recommended Practices, and Engineering Guidelines, along with the highly regarded
SMPTE Journal and its peer-reviewed technical papers." Society of Motion Picture and
Television Engineers, available at http://www.smpte.org/membership/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2004). SMPTE goals include developing industry standards, communicating the
latest developments in technology, enhancing education, and promoting networking
and interaction. [d.
90 SMPTE: Engineering Guideline: Design of Effective Cine Theaters, 5 (1994).
"For most viewers, physical discomfort occurs when the vertical viewing angle to the
top of the screen exceeds 35 [degrees], and when the horizontal line of sight measured
between a perpendicular to [the viewer'sl seat and the centerline of the screen exceeds
15 [degrees]." [d.
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comfort suffered by disabled patrons could be determined
through objective, rather than subjective criteria. 91 The court
stated that although able-bodied patrons are free to choose
from a wide range of "objectively comfortable" seating within
stadium-style theaters, wheelchair-bound patrons do not share
this freedom and are forced to sit in "objectively uncomfortable"
seating in the first few rows. 92 Further, the court stated that
evidence showed the viewing angle in the defendants' theaters
is on average seven degrees higher than the 35 degree limit
classified by the SMPTE as "uncomfortable."93
Second, the Ninth Circuit criticized the lower court's failure to defer to the new interpretation of section 4.33.3 offered
by the DOJ.94 The court stated that an agency's interpretation
of its own regulations should be given substantial deference. 95
This is most important when the regulatory language is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is reasonable. 96 Unlike
the district court, the Ninth Circuit found the DOJ's interpretation to be reasonable based on the definition of "lines of
sight,"97 and its applicability in the movie theater context. 98
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Lara court's legislative and administrative analysis of section 4.33.3. 99 The Ninth Circuit did
not find the legislative and administrative history of section
4.33.3 dispositive either way, so as to compel an interpretation
of "lines of sight comparable" to include viewing angles, or

9'

Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1132 n.7.

92

[d. The court went on to say that these seats are objectively uncomfortable for

all patrons, yet the discomfort is "exacerbated for wheelchair-bound viewers relative to
able-bodied viewers sitting in the same row. [d.
93 [d .
.. [d. at 1131.
.. [d., citing Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) .
.. Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1131, quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991). "When the meaning of regulatory
language is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation of the regulation controls 'so long as
it is "reasonable," that is, so long as the interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose
and wording of the regulations.'" [d.
97 [d.
Definition of "lines of sight" in relevant part, found to consist of "a line
from an observer's eye to a distant point (as on the celestial sphere) toward which he is
looking or directing an observing instrument." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTONARY 1316 (1993) .
.. Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1131. "In the context of a movie theater, this
means a line extending from the viewer's eye to the points on the screen where the film
is projected, taking account the angle from the viewer's eye to those points." [d .
.. [d. at 1132.
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not. 100 Instead, the Ninth Circuit declared that the issue is not
whether the DOJ contemplated "viewing-angle issues in the
context of stadium-style seating at the time when [section]
4.33.3 was promulgated ... [but] whether a broadly-drafted
regulation -- with a broad purpose -- may be applied to a particular factual scenario not expressly anticipated at the time
the regulation was promulgated."lOl Relying on the United
States Supreme Court's approval of this approach as to unambiguous statutory text,102 the Ninth Circuit decided to treat
regulations as analogous. l03
Third, the Ninth Circuit found the district court's hesitation towards the DOJ's interpretation, due to the fact it came
about through an amicus brief, to be unfounded. 104 After all,
"[a]n agency's interpretation of one of its own rules, including
an interpretation expressed in an amicus brief, is controlling
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the rule. "105 Finally, as additional support for rejecting the reasoning in Lara,
the court cited United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corporation/06
which offered similar disapproval of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning. 107
In the end, the Ninth Circuit returned to the language of
the ADA and found it inconceivable that the objectively uncomfortable seating in question provided "full and equal enjoyment" of the movie-going experience by disabled patrons as it
did for the general public. lOS Non-disabled patrons are not subject to experiencing dizziness, nausea, headaches, or blurred

100
101

[d. at 1132-33.
[d. at 1133.

102 See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) ("the fact
that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985))).
103 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133.
104 [d. at 1131 n.6.
106 See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923,945 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in text).
106 Hayts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d. at 88 ("This Court now rules (notwithstanding the contrary reasoning in the Lara decision) that the comparable 'lines of sight'
requirement of Section 4.33.3 means that viewing angles must be taken into account.")
For further discussion of this case see infra notes 186-204 and accompanying text.
107 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133 n.8.
lOB [d. at 1133.
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vision as wheelchair-bound patrons are. 109 In view of this, the
Ninth Circuit held that the DOJ's interpretation was "valid
and entitled to deference."uo Specifically, section 4.33.3 required that the viewing angles for wheelchair-bound patrons
must be "within the range of angles offered to the general public in the stadium-style seats."lll The district court's decision
was reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. u2
B.

THE REGAL DISSENT

Judge Kleinfeld's dissent disagreed with the majority for
several reasons. ll3 First, the dissent agreed with the Oregon
district court that the majority's decision will bring about a
substantial change that would be better handled through an
appropriate rule- making process rather than a retroactive judicial one. U4 Second, other requirements present in the regulation limit the compliance with the majority's rule. us Third, the
dissent disagreed with the majority's definition of "comparable. "U6 Fourth, since a wheelchair section in the front of the
theater was not prohibited before stadium seating, viewing the
same regulation to prohibit the wheelchair placement after the
implementation of stadium seating is illogical,l17 Lastly, the
majority decision creates a conflict with the Fifth Circuit and
provides uncertainty for theater owners as to their legal obligations. u8
Initially, Judge Kleinfeld appeared extremely troubled by
the majority usurping the responsibility to solve a problem that
he felt would be more aptly dealt with through the executive
branch, and which indeed was already recognized as an issue

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
1I6Id.
117 Id. at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 1133 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
109

110
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by the Access Board as listed in their Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1999. 119 The dissent noted that the Access Board is
"proposing to amend the guidelines to include specific technical
provisions" governing sight lines. 12o The dissent further urged
that "[r]egulating movie theater architecture retroactively by
vague judicial fiat is unjust"121 especially given the precision
with which these regulations are written. 122
According to the dissent, the majority ignored other requirements within the regulation that "give context to the lines
of sight requirement, such as the access and emergency exit
requirements. "123 These requirements are present to ensure
that disabled patrons are not isolated in a "wheelchair ghetto"
from the other patrons and that they are able to sit next to
their friends and family.124 In addition, these requirements allow disabled patrons to get in and out of the theater, both with
ease and in cases of emergency. 125 The dissent offers these
other requirements as reasons wheelchair seating is located in
the front, flat portion of the theater.126
Like the Oregon district court and the Fifth Circuit, the
dissent poses the question, "comparable to what?"127 The dissent retreats to the subjective rationale of those earlier decisions. 128 Although conceding that "as a matter of geometry a
line of sight will not be identical to any particular other seat,"
the dissent claims that the wheelchair seating is "comparable"
to the seats immediately adjacent to them. 129 Judge Kleinfeld
119
120
121

See ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278.
See [d. at 62,277.
Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).

[d. For comparable specificity in the C.F.R. regarding wheelchair accessibility
guidelines, see 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.31.8 (2003) (telephone cord length must be
at least 29 in.); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.32.3 (2003) (wheelchair seating
knee clearance at tables and counters must be "at least 27 in (685 mm) high, 30 in (760
mm) wide, and 19 in (485 mm) deep.").
123 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
124 [d. See infra notes 149-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term
"wheelchair ghetto."
125 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
126 [d.
The other requirements of § 4.33.3 are "that wheelchair areas be 'an integral part' of the fixed seating plan, that they 'adjoin an accessible route' that also
serves as an emergency exit, that they be adjacent to 'companion' seating, and that
they have 'lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public.'" [d.,
quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
127 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
128 [d. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
129 [d.
122
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articulated that "comparable" means "similar or equivalent to,"
and does not mean "better than" as the DOJ asserted. 130 Judge
Kleinfeld expressed confusion over the DOJ's interpretation of
comparable as meaning ''better than the viewing angles ... provided by 50 percent of the seats."131
Further, the dissent fails to see how a regulation can address stadium-style seating, when the majority conceded that it
was a "factual scenario not expressly anticipated at the time
the regulation was promulgated."132 Judge Kleinfeld goes on to
state that since "regulations did not prohibit a wheelchair section in the front of the theater before [stadium seating], it is
impossible to justify a construction that the very same regulation prohibits the very same wheelchair seating, with identical
angles of view, after stadium seating came into use."133
The dissent is dissatisfied with the circuit split. 134 The dissent ultimately criticized the majority's opinion for vagueness
and for failing to offer guidance to theater owners regarding
compliance with the law. 135 In Judge Kleinfeld's own words,
"[t]he least the majority could do in its retroactive legislative
effort is offer a holding that can be translated into a floorplan."136 Judge Kleinfeld postulates that he might be able to
create a scheme that would satisfy the majority decision, however, he is uncertain that the design would be accepted by the
majority or even that it would be the least expensive means of
compliance. 137

'30

[d. at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE

DICTIONARY 300 (2d ed. 1982).

See ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278.
Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), citing the majorityopinion at 1133.
133 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
134 [d. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("A purportedly uniform federal regulation now means something different in the Ninth Circuit from what it means in the
Fifth.").
135 [d. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
136 [d. at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
037 [d. at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
031

032
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III. A CRITIQUE OF REGAL
By adopting the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3, the
Ninth Circuit in Regal advanced the goals of Title III of the
ADA.13S Due to the decision in Regal, viewing angles for wheelchair seating must be provided within the range of angles offered to the general public in stadium-style seating. 139 Mter all,
ensuring that people with disabilities have access to "the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation" is the central goal of Title 111. 140 It would be
difficult to argue that a disabled moviegoer, someone already
subject to physical infirmities, enjoys the overall movie-going
experience as much as the average person, especially if his or
her seat is unfavorably placed. Although the dissent criticizes
several deficiencies within the majority opinion, most of Judge
Kleinfeld's concerns are either misdirected or too narrowly construed.
A.

THE MAJORITY As RULEMAKER

The dissent began by stating that the majority's approach
to this whole situation was unjust in light of the fact that the
Access Board is considering creating new regulations dealing
with stadium-style movie theaters.141 While this may be a valid
concern, how long should disabled moviegoers be forced to wait
for a change? In response to the DOJ's interpretation of section
4.33.3 and the frequent placement of wheelchair seating in the
front rows, the Access Board published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in 1999 that would consider new regulations for
stadium-style movie theaters.142 Although the Access Board
noted the importance of providing wheelchair patrons better

Id. at 1133 (majority opinion).
Id.
140 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
141 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133-34 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
1<2 ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278.
138
139
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lines of sight, they also stated that according to design professionals, measuring compliance in regards to such concerns
might prove difficult and uncertain. That was four years ago. 143
It took only two years from the advent of stadium-style
theaters for a discrimination claim to be filed by the plaintiffs
in Lara. 144 And, it took two years from that point for the Access
Board even to recognize the DOJ's position regarding comparing lines of sightY5 Now, four years later, the Access Board
has done nothing about this concern. Yet, the dissent maintains that the Access Board is best suited to handle this situation in the most efficient manner. 146 If and when the Access
Board adopts a regulation resembling the DOJ's position, the
requirements under the regulation "will be clear, precise, and
prospective. "147 In light of the Access Board's lack of diligence
in addressing this issue however, the majority did the right
thing and achieved the same purpose by expressly not turning
its back on movie theater discrimination.
The dissent should not have criticized the majority for involving themselves in an area of concern that needed attention.
In addition, the Access Board should look at the majority's decision not as an infringement on their autonomy, but instead as
a call to arms. The Access Board should use the general guidelines and concerns that the majority laid out in the Regal decision, giving great attention to the DOJ's interpretation, and
create the new regulations for stadium-style movie theaters
that it said it would. Further, the Access Board's uncertainty
in measuring compliance with lines-of-sight regulations is no
longer a concern, given the facts surrounding comfortable viewing angles offered in the SMPTE engineering guidelines. 148

"" Id. at 62,277.
,« See Lara I, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1.
'45 ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278.
'46 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
'47 Id.
'48 SMPTE: Engineering Guideline: Design of Effective Cine Theaters, 5 (1994).
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WHEELCHAIR GHETTO

Judge Kleinfeld recognized the majority's concern against
having a "wheelchair ghetto" located in one portion of the theater, offering disadvantageous lines of sight compared to those of
other patrons.149 Despite this valid concern, Judge Kleinfeld
discounted this as a chimera/50 asserting that the regulation
already addresses this issue. 151 While this mayor may not be
true, this assertion does not determine whether the language,
"lines of sight," encompasses viewing angles. In fact, the dissent concludes that the majority should not be concerned with
a wheelchair ghetto since the regulation prohibits "a wheelchair ghetto out of the way, behind a post, or off to the side."152
Not only does this assume that the words, "lines of sight," exclude viewing angles, but also assumes that the only way to
have a wheelchair ghetto is to segregate disabled people into
their own section, or to provide them seats in which their view
is obstructed.
The fact that wheelchair seating is placed in the front row,
technically mingled with the general public and not separated,
does not eviscerate the notion of a wheelchair ghetto. In the
1950's, African-Americans were forced to sit in the back of public buses and yield the front of the bus to whites. 153 Although
the back of a bus is not technically separate from the front, we
would be hard pressed to say that this disparate treatment did
not amount to a form of discrimination. The flagrant discrimi149 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
The term
"wheelchair ghetto" is only employed by the dissent and not the majority decision. Id.
The term "wheelchair ghetto" is meant to describe an area of a theater containing substandard seating as a result of the section's "sight lines [that are) worse than those
[offered to) the other patrons." Id.
ISO A chimera is defined as "an illusion or fabrication of the mind; an unrealizable
dream." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 233 (1984).
151 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld
interpreted the language of § 4.33.3 of the ADAAG to mean that in those theaters
where the seating capacity does not exceed 300, wheelchair seating may be grouped
together rather than distributed throughout the theater, as long as the wheelchair
seating is not separated from the general seating and the lines of sight are not sub·
stantially different from those offered to the general public. Id.
152Id.
153 Time
100:
Heroes
&
Icons
Rosa
Parks,
available
at
http://www.time.com/timeitimel00iheroesiprofileiparks01.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2004).
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nation that Rosa Parks i54 and the civil rights movement helped
eliminate and that which the plaintiffs in Regal fought against
are comparable. i55
Wheelchair seating that is provided in the first row of a
movie theater, while not physically separated from the general
seating, constitutes a form of discrimination. i56 Compared with
that of the general public, the wheelchair seating area is not
provided comparable lines of sight due to inferior viewing angles.
Judge Kleinfeld discounts the majority's view of a wheelchair ghetto before even attempting to attack the notion that
comparable viewing angles must be read within the "lines of
sight" language. Instead, Judge Kleinfeld justified the placement of the wheelchair seating provided in the flat, front portion of the theater due to theater owners' need to comply with
other requirements, such as those for access and emergency
exits. i57 The dissent asserts that the majority disregards these
necessary concerns, and which are sure to complicate any construction plan. i5s The majority does not, however, ignore these
requirements under the regulation, but instead gives the linesof-sight requirement equal weight. Compliance with all the
1" [d. Rosa Parks was born on February 4, 1913 in Tuskegee, Alabama. [d. Mrs.
Parks, a black woman, became part of the civil rights movement through one simple
act. [d. On December 1, 1955, Mrs. Parks got on a bus to go home in Montgomery,
AL., and sat down in the first row of the bus designated for blacks. [d. But as the bus
became more crowded, Mrs. Parks was ordered to give up her seat to a white woman.
[d. She refused. [d. Although Mrs. Parks was arrested, her choice to remain seated
led to the disintegration of segregation in the South. [d.
155 The
Access
Board
website,
available
at
http://www.accessboard.gov/aboutlADA.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). Indeed, the ADA was even modeled after historic laws preventing race and gender based discrimination. [d.
156 Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F.Supp. 698, 712 (D. Or. 1997). A
wheelchair ghetto must be thought of in terms of desirability. [d. The court stated in
Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp. that an arena owner can't create
a wheelchair ghetto that consigns wheelchair-bound patrons to the least desirable
seats in the venue. [d.
157 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
158 [d.
In addressing the importance ofthese other concerns which theater owners
must comply with, the dissent states: "The 'integral part' requirement prohibits a separate and noncontiguous wheelchair ghetto, the companion seating provision prohibits
separation of the disabled from friends and family, and the access route provision assures that the disabled can get in and out of the movie theater conveniently and safely
(which may require that they be in the flat area in front)." [d. For further discussion
of the integration requirement and its advantages in solving the sight line problems in
question, see Civil Rights -- Americans With Disabilities Act - Ninth Circuit Holds That
Movie Theaters Must Provide Comparable Viewing Angles For Patrons in Wheelchairs,
117 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (2003).
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requirements under section 4.33.3 is no doubt an architectural
and construction nightmare, however, this is no reason to ignore one of the provisions merely for simplicity and ease. More
important, it is unnecessary to ignore the lines-of-sight requirement.
The dissent's argument that wheelchair seating is placed
in the front of the theater in order to comply with all of the requirements under section 4.33.3 is unjustified. In Lara, there
were two Tinseltown theaters whose design was not contested,
which provided wheelchair seating in the back of the auditorium as well as in the front, and was accessible by means of an
elevator. 159 Similarly, one of Regal's theaters had four auditoriums that provided wheelchair-accessible seating in the stadium riser section. 160 Assuming that those theaters complied
with the other requirements of section 4.33.3, providing wheelchair seating more options than the front row while maintaining compliance with the regulation as a whole is possible.
C.

COMPARABLE TO WHAT?

Judge Kleinfeld correctly stated that the meaning of "comparable" as it relates to the "lines of sight" language in the
regulation is the heart of this case.l6l Judge Kleinfeld defined
"comparable" as "similar or equivalent" and disagrees with the
DOJ's interpretation that "comparable" means "equivalent to or
better than fifty percent of the seats. "162 The dissent poses the
question, "comparable to what?"I63 Judge Kleinfeld opined that
reading "comparable" to mean "similar or equivalent to" the
viewing angles provided for non-wheelchair seating is more
natural than defining the word to mean "better than" the nonwheelchair seating. l64 While one might agree with Judge Kleinfeld's interpretation of the meaning of "comparable" as a status
of equivalence instead of superiority, the means with which
Judge Kleinfeld rationalized and implemented his interpretation is flawed.
Lara I, 1998 WL 1048497, at *1 n.1-2.
Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1128 n.3.
,., Id. at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
''''' Id., citing The American Heritage Dictionary 300 (2d ed. 1982).
163 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
164 Id.
159
160
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Judge Kleinfeld pointed out that viewing angles differ with
every seat in the auditorium, and that there is no possible way
for a wheelchair-bound patron's line of sight to be comparable
to that of all these seats. 165 Further, Judge Kleinfeld agreed
with the Fifth Circuit and stated that seating preferences in
movie theaters are highly subjective and vary with each individual. 166 In light of this subjectivity, Judge Kleinfeld stated
that the wheelchair seating in the front of the theater is comparable to the non-wheelchair seating also in the front of the
theater, which is preferred by the patrons who like to sit up
front. 167 According to the dissent, this meets the regulation's
requirements. 16s Judge Kleinfeld fails to view seating in the
first few rows of a movie theater as undesirable, stating that
"[i]f the seats up front, or in the back, were uniformly considered undesirable, theaters would have to charge less for them.
They don't."169 While the front row seating in a movie theater
may not be uniformly considered undesirable by moviegoers
everywhere, it is evident that the seats are clearly not the best
in the auditorium and not favored by most movie patrons.
Anyone who has gone to see a popular movie on opening
night knows that right before the movie sells out, the seats in
the first few rows are always the last to be filled.l7O This is a
consideration moviegoers take into account when determining
when they should arrive at a theater. Moviegoers know that
the longer they delay their arrival, the greater the possibility
that the preferable seats will already be taken. They know
165 [d. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
Kleinfeld notes that to do this would
require the "scattering of wheelchair seating that the 300·seat provision [of § 4.33.3)
expressly avoids requiring in small theaters." [d.
1GS [d.
In describing the ways in which the preferences of movie watchers differ,
Kleinfeld stated the following: "Some people like to sit up front, for maximum size of
picture and stereo effect of the sound, and to avoid distractions from people in front of
them. Some people like to sit in back, for the greater height and sense of separation
from the picture. Some like the aisles, so they can get out easily to go to the bathroom
or the popcorn stand. Some like the center, so they won't be distracted by the people
who get up during the movie to go [to) the bathroom or the popcorn stand." [d.
167 [d.
168 [d.
169 [d.
170 United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1105 n.15 (C.D. Cal.
2002). In March 1997, a trial attorney for the DOJ, Joe Russo, gave a presentation to
theater owners on the requirements of § 4.33.3. [d. at 1105. In regards to front row
seating, Russo stated in his presentation that "these are not the first seats that go
when you go to the movies. Nobody runs into the movie theater to see Terminator 200
and runs to the front seat so they can get neck strain like this." [d. at 1105 n.15.
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they will be forced to sit closer to the screen than they would
prefer, resulting in a diminished movie-going experience. Nondisabled patrons have the ability to improve their seating and
overall movie-watching experience. In contrast, wheelchairbound patrons are confined to a particular location and position, unable to improve their overall movie experience. Moreover, wheelchair-bound patrons who are forced to sit in the
front row have experienced dizziness, nausea, headaches, or
blurred vision as a result of their wheelchair confinement and
front-row seating, whereas non-disabled patrons are able to
avoid against these problems either by reclining or slouching in
their seats. l7l
In the end, the dissent's argument, that the wheelchair
seating provided up front is comparable to the other seating
provided to the patrons who prefer to sit up front, is unpersuasive. The lines of sight provided within these seats are distinguishable because non-disabled patrons have the ability to recline and slouch, whereas due to their disability, wheelchairbound patrons generally do not share the same flexibility. The
dissent sidestepped this issue simply by stating that theater
owners cannot command wheelchair manufacturers to construct wheelchairs with the same reclining tilt as movie theater
seats enjoy.172 The dissent's reliance on this argument is misplaced. Theaters should recognize the limits disabled people
face and provide wheelchair seating in areas of the theater that
would not require the patrons to recline or slouch. The regulations should work towards the disabled patrons' benefit and not
to their detriment.
The dissent asserts that providing more accommodating
seating for wheelchair-bound patrons is not within the theaters' control, stating that "[t]hose who use wheelchair spaces in
a movie theater bring their own chairs."173 While the dissent
attempts to draw attention to the lack of control a theater has
over the construction and constraints of a wheelchair, in effect
Judge Kleinfeld is stating that these individuals are disabled,
and there is nothing he can do about that. 174 This is exactly the
171

172
173
174

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
[d.
[d. The dissent stated the following: "The wheelchair manufacturer and pur-

chaser in substantial part control the vertical viewing angle, and the wheelchair space
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type of discrimination the ADA was created to protect against.
Unlike Judge Kleinfeld's design, comparability must be interpreted in light of the purpose of Title III of the ADA. In accord
with the DOJ's interpretation, lines of sight should be considered comparable if they provide disabled persons' equal enjoyment of the benefits of public accommodations, or in this case,
the movie-watching experience. 175

D.

WHEELCHAIR SEATING BEFORE THE STADIUM STYLE

Judge Kleinfeld pointed out that section 4.33.3 did not address the issue or prohibit wheelchair seating in the front row
of a theater before the advent of stadium-style theaters.176
Consequently, the court, as Judge Kleinfeld contends, may not
read into it now as doing such. 177 This criticism of the majority's argument, however, ignores the freedoms that the traditional theater design offered to handicapped patrons. In the
traditional sloped-theater design, persons in wheelchairs had
more options. They could either use the handicapped spaces
provided by the theater, wherever they might be, or they could
park their chair anywhere along the theater aisle that best
suited their viewing preference. With the stadium-style theater design, handicapped patrons lose these options and are
forced to use only the spaces provided by the theater.
E.

No GUIDANCE TO THEATER OWNERS

Judge Kleinfeld stated that the main problem with the majority's decision leaves theater owners unsure of what they
need to do in order to comply with section 4.33.3 of the
provided by the movie theater controls the horizontal angle." [d. The gist of Kleinfeld's
statement is that the movie theaters' control is limited to an extent. [d. While this is,
of course, true, it is still within the theaters' control to alleviate the concerns and discomforts felt by wheelchair-bound patrons by providing more advantageous seating
locations.
175 42 U.S.C. 12182(a) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
In its
amicus curiae brief, the DOJ asserted, "[tlhe quality of the viewing experience is quite
relevant to whether there is 'equal enjoyment' of the benefits of a movie theater. A
wheelchair user who must watch a movie from an extreme angle that causes significant discomfort and distortion of the picture has not been afforded 'equal enjoyment' of
the movie if most other patrons are able to watch the film at more comfortable angles."
Appellants Brief Urging Reversal at 14.
176 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
177 [d.
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ADAAG.17S Judge Kleinfeld further stated he would have preferred a "floorplan" from the majority with which theater owners might better interpret its holding. 179 It is important to note
that throughout his dissent, Judge Kleinfeld criticized the majority for interfering with the rulemaking process. ISO Yet, the
Circuit Judge requests more specificity from the court in regards to a movie theater's proper compliance with section
4.33.3. 1S1 According to the dissent, the majority's decision
leaves thousands of theaters violating section 4.33.3 and must
begin a reconstruction process with only a vague outline of
what they need to do in order to comply with the regulation. 1s2
The majority's decision however, does not lack such specificity
as Judge Kleinfeld asserts.
Kathleen L. Wilde of the Oregon Advocacy Center in Portland, who represented the plaintiffs in Regal, said that the decision requires Regal and other theaters to "retrofit their theaters so that wheelchair seats can be among the stadium style
seating, which is so highly desired."ls3 Indeed, is this not all
that is needed? Providing wheelchair seating in the stadium
section will comply with the majority's decision and provide
wheelchair patrons lines of sight to the screen that are comparable with those provided to able-bodied patrons. The majority
decision in Regal, therefore, was indeed sufficient.
IV. THE HOYTS DECISIONS

At this time, only the Fifth, Ninth and most recently the
Sixth Circuit have addressed section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG and
reached a conclusion as to whether viewing angles should be
included within the meaning of "lines of sight comparable."l84
[d. at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
[d. at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
ISO [d.
181 [d.
182 [d. at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). In Kleinfeld's opinion, "lilt is irresponsible to impose on a country a decision that will require of an industry so much reconstruction, without clear guidance on what must be done." [d.
183 Ragged Edge Online Magazine, Moviegoers in Wheelchairs Win Victory in
Oregon, available at http://www.ragged-edge-mag.comldrnJ08_03.shtml#591 (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). See also David Watson, Ninth Circuit Rules: Movie Theaters May
Not Relegate Wheelchair Patrons to Front, Metropolitan News-Enterprise, available at
http://www.metnews.comlarticles/oreg081403.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
184 See generally Lara II, 207 F.3d 783; Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126; United
States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003).
178

179
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Several district courts, however, have grappled with the
sue. 1SS

A

29
IS-

UNITED STATES V. HOYTS CINEMAS CORPORATION

In 2000, the United States Attorney's Office sued two major Massachusetts-based movie-theater chains.ls6 The government sued the theater companies in a Massachusetts District
Court alleging that they designed, built, and operated movie
theaters that denied equal access to wheelchair users under
section 303(a)(1) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. Section 12183(a)(1), and
of course, Section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG.IS7 In United States u.
Hoyts Cinemas Corporation,188 the disputed theater designs
were similar to those in Lara and Regal. The design provided
wheelchair seating either exclusively in the traditional seating
section located in front of the stadium section, or, alternatively,
in the front row of the stadium section on the access-aisle that
separates the two sections. 189 The designs of the theaters, however, were not the only similarities between Hoyts and Regal.
185 See Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73; Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d 14; see also
United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2002), in which the
California district court found Lara's reasoning that "lines of sight comparable" require
only an "unobstructed view," to be unpersuasive. [d. at 1110. AMC noted that "[tlhe
Fifth Circuit relied on other references in the Code of Federal Regulations to 'lines of
sight' and concluded that in each instance the reference concerned the presence or
absence of obstructions." [d. However, AMC failed to see how the regulations which
dealt with the placement of antennae, what constitutes "direct supervision," and operation of snowmobiles by juveniles under the age of 16, had any applicability in this instance. [d. The following cases described within this portion of my Note are included
to offer a perspective on how district courts in other circuits have addressed § 4.33.3 of
theADAAG.
186 Federal Judge Rules for Stadium Seating for Wheelchairs, New England News,
available at http://web1.whdh.comlnewsiarticlesllocallAl11281 Gast visited Feb. 15,
2004) The two movie theater companies were National Amusements Inc., based in
Dedham, and Hoyts Cinemas Corp., based in Boston. Id. Both theater companies were
ranked in 2000 among the ten largest movie theater companies in the country. [d. The
companies both began constructing stadium-style theaters in 1997. [d.
1S7 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
In Hoyts, the government originally
brought two separate civil actions against each of the theater companies. [d. Since the
two complaints were virtually identical, the Massachusetts district court consolidated
the two actions. [d. The complaint set forth two counts. [d. Count I is discussed in
this Note. Count II is not discussed and was dismissed by the court on August 22,
2001. [d., see also United States v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 251, 262
(D. Mass. 2001).
ISS Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73.
ISS [d. at 79. A majority of the designs provided wheelchair seating both on the
access-aisle separating the traditional and stadium-style sections, and in the traditional section as well. [d. A minority of theaters provided wheelchair seating only in
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The Hoyts court's decision, mentioned in a footnote by the
court in Regal, similarly rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
in Lara. 19o In Hoyts, the government argued that the reasoning
in Lara and its progeny were flawed for several reasons. l9l
First, the government contended that the Fifth Circuit was incorrect in determining that lines of sight were defined only in
terms of an unobstructed view. 192 According to the government,
the Fifth Circuit offered no factual support from the regulation's language to justify such a ruling. 193 Second, in making a
historical analysis, the Fifth Circuit relied on Technical Assistance Manuals that were written before the advent of stadiumstyle theaters.194 Third, the Fifth Circuit did not defer to the
DOJ's interpretation of its own regulation. 195 Finally, the court
in Lara selectively limited its analysis to certain portions of the
regulation in question. 196 As a result, the court ignored the sections of the proposed regulation that considered viewing angles
when determining whether lines of sight were comparable. 197
The Hoyts court agreed with the government's arguments
concerning Lara's interpretation of "lines of sight comparable."198 Hoyts especially disagreed with Lara's reasoning, that
lines of sight need only provide unobstructed views, given the
regulation'S express language requiring comparability to those

the traditional style section. ld. And, a small minority of these designs offered wheelchair accessible seating only in the front row ofthe traditional style section. ld.
190 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d at 1133 n.8.
191 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 84. At the time of this decision, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet decided Regal, therefore as Lara's progeny, the
court lists the Oregon district court decision in Regal, as well as United States v.
Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., Case No. CIV.A.99-705, slip op. (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19,2001). ld.
192 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
193 ld.
194 Id.
lOSld.
196

ld.

197 ld. at 84 n.8. In a footnote, the Hoyts court provided the language of the regulation, which was omitted by the Lara court. Id.The omitted section ofthe regulation
stated as follows: "As stadium-style theaters are currently designed, patrons using
wheelchair spaces are often relegated to a few rows of each auditorium, in the traditional sloped floor area near the screen. Due to the size and proximity of the screen, as
well as other factors related to stadium-style design, patrons using wheelchair spaces
are required to tilt their heads back at uncomfortable angles and to constantly move
their heads from side to side to view the screen. They are afforded inferior lines of
sight to the screen." ld., quoting ADDAG for Buildings and Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. at
62,277.
198 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 85.
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of the general public. 199 In the end, the court did not grant the
retroactive injunctive relief sought by the government. 200 Instead, Hoyts mandated that relief should be granted only prospectively.201 Despite this, if the theaters were to make any
changes to their establishments (including construction or refurbishment) that required a building permit, the theaters
would then be required to comply with section 4.33.3 and provide wheelchair seating in the stadium section. 202 In an effort
to alleviate any confusion, the court explicitly stated that
"wheelchair seating cannot be located solely in the traditional
section, nor solely in the access-aisle, nor solely in both the traditional section and access-aisle" if compliance with section
4.33.3 of the ADAAG is to be met.203 This decision is pending
appeal in the First Circuit. 204
B.

MEINEKER V. HOYTS CINEMAS CORPORATION

In 1998, plaintiffs Susan Meineker and Sybil McPherson
brought a ~uit against Hoyts Cinemas Corporation in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York.205 In Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corporation,206 the plaintiffs alleged a violation of Title III of the ADA based on the
wheelchair seating configuration at the defendant's theater,
located in the Crossgates Mall in Albany, New York.207 Similar
to the plaintiffs in Lara and Regal, Meineker and McPherson
are disabled and forced to use wheelchairs.208 Further, each
reported difficulty viewing the screen from the wheelchair
seats located in the front of the theater directly under the
screen, and suffered discomfort from the constant seat-shifting
and neck-craning required in order to view the movie. 209 Due to
'99
200
201
202
203

[d.
[d. at 91.
[d.
[d. at 93.
[d.

204 Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, appeal pending, No. 03-1646 (lst Cir.
argument scheduled for after July 31, 2003).
205 Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d 14.
206 Id.
207 [d. at 15.
208 [d.
209 [d. The court noted that "[slubsequent to the commencement of this litigation,
the wheelchair seating was renovated between November 2000 and March 2001. The
wheelchair seating was relocated to the rear of the floor section behind several rows of
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the lack of wheelchair seating in the stadium section of the
theater, the plaintiffs claimed that the wheelchair patrons
were not offered lines of sight comparable to those provided to
the general public as section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG requires. 21o
In analyzing the straightforward question surrounding the
meaning of "lines of sight," the district court in Meineker recognized the decisions of the cases that already dealt with the issue. 211 Within these prior rulings, the Meineker court noted
that the "lines of sight" language does not impose a viewingangle requirement, but mandates only an unobstructed view. 212
Nonetheless, the district court held that the language of the
regulation requires more than just an unobstructed view since
the word "comparable" provides a qualitative requirement in
the regulation.213 Indeed, the presence of the word "comparable" requires that the sight line to the screen be "similar" and
not merely "similarly unobstructed," compared with the sight
lines offered to the general public. 214
Notwithstanding the court's position that section 4.33.3
requires more than just an unobstructed view, and disagreeing
with the Fifth Circuit, the Meineker court held that the viewing
angles offered to wheelchair-bound patrons were "comparable
to those afforded to a significant portion of the general public. "215 The court reached this conclusion in light of the defendant's renovations to the wheelchair seating area/ 16 renovations which included moving the wheelchair seating to the rear
of the floor section, away from the front of the theater where
plaintiffs were originally forced to sit.217 The court stated that
if the defendants had not relocated the wheelchair seating at
general public seating, and as close to the center of the theater as possible." Id. (citations omitted). This was a critical factor to the court's subsequent decision.
210 Id. at 16. The plaintiffs argued additionally that the wheelchair seating violates the ADA since (1) the wheelchair seating is not an integral part of the fixed seating plan, (2) the theaters provide no wheelchair access to the stadium seating area, and
(3) the wheelchair seating is "separate and unequal." Id.
211 Id. at 17. At the time of the district court's decision, the cases available were
the Fifth Circuit decision in Lara, the Oregon district court decision in Regal, as well
as United States v. Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., Case No. CIV.A.99-705, slip op. (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 19, 2001). Id.
212 Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
213Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216Id.
217 See supra note 206.
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the Crossgates theaters, "it would unquestionably have been in
violation of the ADA."21B Less than one year later, the district
court's decision was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and sent back to the lower courts
on remand. 219
On appeal, the plaintiffs maintained that the defendant
was not in compliance with section 4.33.3 due to its failure to
offer wheelchair patrons comparable lines of sight, as well as
its failure to make wheelchair seating an integral part of the
fIxed seating plan. 220 The purpose for the remand concerns the
issue of whether deference should be given to the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3. 221 This issue arose for the fIrst time
on appeal when the DOJ fIrst entered the case as amicus curiae
at the request of the Court of Appeals during oral arguments. 222
Besides determining if the DOJ's interpretation is entitled to
deference, the district court will need to factually analyze
whether the defendant had reasonably sufficient notice of the
interpretation to mandate compliance with the regulation. 223
Although the Second Circuit failed to render a decision regarding the district court's analysis, the order of the Second
Circuit left little doubt as to which direction it was leaning. In
addition to the issues of deference and notice, the Second Circuit outlined six specifIc factual issues for the district court to

218 Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 18 n.4. In footnote 4, the court went into significant detail noting the reason the comparability requirement of the regulation should
encompass viewing angles. [d. The court stated the following: "This requirement is
necessary to address the potential situation where a defendant has relegated wheelchair patrons to a portion of the theater that provided truly inferior viewing angles and
limited or no seating for the general public--such as was the case at the start of this
litigation where wheelchair patrons were relegated to the absolute worst seats at the
very front of the theaters. It would defy common sense to describe the lines of sight
afforded by such viewing positions as 'comparable' merely because they were unobstructed." [d.
219 Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., No. 02-9034, 2003 WL 21510423, *26 (2nd
Cir. July 1, 2003).
220 [d. at 22.
221 [d. at 24.
The court notes that remand is necessary since the defendant argued that all the evidence cited to by the DOJ is outside the record on appeal, and that
the defendant lacked reasonable notice of the DOJ's position. [d. at 24-25. The Second
Circuit stated that these arguments require a fact finding by the district court. [d. at
25.
222 [d.. at 24.
Besides the DOJ, the Second Circuit also requested letter briefs
addressing the issue of deference to and notice of the DOJ's interpretation of § 4.33.3
from the National Association of Theater Owners, and from the defendant. [d. at 25.
223 [d. at 25.
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determine on remand. 224 After almost each one, the court provided a footnote in which it pointed the district court in the appropriate direction, and practically gave them the answers to
the factual questions in which they were assigned. 225 Taken
together, the footnotes state that the defendant and the defense's architect endorsed the SMPTE Engineering Guidelines
(maintained as an appropriate industry standard by the court),
which described levels of physical discomfort suffered by viewers based on vertical viewing angles. 226 Given the court of appeal's deference to the SMPTE guidelines, it is highly likely
that they want to find in favor of the plaintiffs in this case, and
thereby bring the Second Circuit into accord with the Ninth
Circuit. Only time will tell whether this prediction will become
a reality.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Regal reaffirmed the
strength of the ADA and its purpose. After all, holding that
"lines of sight comparable" encompass a viewing-angle requirement is not only reasonable in light of common sense, but
is in accord with the general mandate of the ADA that "[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of ... any place of public
accommodation. "227 Wheelchair-bound moviegoers forced to sit
in the front row of a movie theater lack the opportunity to gain
the full and equal enjoyment of the movie- watching experience
as compared with the general public. The Ninth Circuit in Regal recognized this injustice and remedied it.

22. [d. The issues were the following: "(1) Hoyts's notice of, and intent to comply
with, the requirements of the ADA at the time of construction or renovation of the
Crossgates theaters; (2) Hoyts's position in previous legal communications (submitted
to administrative or judicial entities) regarding lines of sight; (3) the knowledge of
Hoyts's architect at the time of construction or renovation of these facilities, including
his understanding of lines of sight; (4) the understanding of Hoyts's officials of the
meaning oflines of sight; (5) the industry's understanding of the terms used in § 4.33.3,
including 'comparable lines of sight' at the time of construction or renovation of these
facilities; and (6) customer seating preference data." [d.
225 [d. at 25 n.6-1O.
226 [d. at 25 n. 7-10.
227 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
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In the Regal case, a petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court was filed on October 27,2003. 228 In light
of the circuit split, it is likely that Regal will be heard by the
United States Supreme Court. 229 That aside, the Regal decision
has dealt the first blow to the disability discrimination practiced in a majority of stadium-style theaters around the nation.
It is hoped it will not be the last.
JOSHUA D. WATTS'

228 Regal Cinemas II, 339 F.3d 1126, petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3310
(U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 03-641).
229 David Watson, Ninth Circuit Rules: Movie Theaters May Not Relegate WheelMetropolitan
News-Enterprise,
available
at
chair Patrons
to
Front,
http://www.metnews.com/articles/oreg081403.htm (last visited Feb. 15,2004). Lawyer
Greg Hurley of Kutak Rock in Irvine, CA expressed this view. Id. Hurley filed an
amicus brief in the case on behalf of the National Association of Theater Owners. Id.
J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2005; Bachelor
of Arts in Economics and Philosophy from Bucknell University. I would like to thank
the Law Review staff at Golden Gate University for their input and support, especially
Mary FitzPatrick and Janet Barbookles. I would also like to thank my roommates for
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